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DOES DISPUTING THROUGH AGENTS
ENHANCE COOPERATION? EXPERIMENTAL
EVIDENCE
RACHEL CROSON and ROBERT H. MNOOKIN*
Abstract
A distinctive characteristic of our mechanisms for conflict resolution is that liti-
gation is carried out by agents chosen by disputing principals. Does the fact that
clients choose lawyers to carry on their disputes facilitate dispute resolution or in-
stead exacerbate conflict? The dominant contemporary view is that the involvement
of lawyers magnifies the contentiousness of litigation and wastes social resources,
prolonging and escalating the conflict in ways that enrich the legal profession but
not the clients. But in a recent article, Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin suggest
another possibility: by choosing lawyers with reputations for cooperation, clients
may commit to cooperative litigation in circumstances where the clients themselves
would not otherwise trust each other. Using the methodology of experimental eco-
nomics, this article presents a test of their idea that, by choosing cooperative agents
under well-specified procedures, principals may sustain more cooperation than
they could on their own. Our experimental findings are consistent with the Gilson-
Mnookin hypothesis.
I. Introduction
A distinctive characteristic of our formal mechanisms for conflict resolu-
tion is that litigation is carried out by agents chosen by the disputing princi-
pals. Does the fact that clients choose lawyers to carry on their disputes
facilitate dispute resolution or instead exacerbate conflict? The dominant
contemporary view is that the involvement of lawyers magnifies the inher-
ent contentiousness of litigation and typically leads to wasting social re-
sources by prolonging and escalating the conflict in ways that may enrich
the legal profession but not the clients.1 But in a recent article, Ronald Gil-
* Rachel Croson is an assistant professor at the Wharton School of the University of Penn-
sylvania, and Robert H. Mnookin is the Williston Professor of Law at Harvard Law School,
where he is the chair of the Program on Negotiation. This research was supported by the
Harvard Negotiation Research Project, as well as by the partial support Mnookin received
from the Harvard Law School Program in Law and Economics as a Sheldon Seevak Fellow.
1 For sources criticizing the legal profession for unnecessarily intensifying hostility be-
tween disputants, see Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents:
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXVI (June 1997)]
 1997 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/97/2602-0001$01.50
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son and Robert Mnookin suggested another possibility: by choosing law-
yers with reputations for cooperation, clients might be able to commit to
cooperative litigation strategies in circumstances where the clients them-
selves would not otherwise trust each other.2 Using the methodology of ex-
perimental economics, this article presents the results of our test of their
idea that, by choosing agents under well-specified procedures, principals
may be able to cooperate more often than they could without such proce-
dures.
The use of experimental economics methods in legal research is a recent
but growing practice. Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer provide an
experimental test of some implications of the Coase Theorem, and a later
paper by the same authors examines the implications of entitlements and
rights in that setting.3 Hoffman and Spitzer’s papers highlight limitations of
the Coase Theorem and discuss the implications of those limitations for the
law and legal practice. Don Coursey and Linda Stanley provide an experi-
mental test of pretrial bargaining in the shadow of the law.4 Their results
generally confirm the theoretical predictions previously generated.5 More
recently, Babcock and coauthors have examined experimentally how self-
serving expectations and beliefs affect the frequency of lawsuits.6 In the
spirit of this previous research, this article reports an experimental test of a
legal theory. Excellent reviews of the field of experimental economics can
be found in two recent textbooks.7
Because our experiments are based on the ‘‘litigation game’’ and ‘‘prelit-
igation game’’ developed in the Gilson and Mnookin article, these are sum-
Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum L Rev 509, 510 nn8–10
(1994).
2 Id.
3 Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,
28 J Law & Econ 653 (1982); and Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, Entitlements,
Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subject’s Concepts of Distributive
Justice, 14 J Legal Stud 259 (1985).
4 Don Coursey and Linda Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within the Shadow of the
Law, 8 Intl Rev L & Econ 161 (1988).
5 Particularly in R. Mnookin and L. Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950 (1979); and Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, and Robert
Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior 11
J Legal Stud 225 (1982).
6 Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, and Colin Camerer, Self-
Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J Legal Stud 135 (1993); and
Linda Babcock, Henry Farber, Cynthia Fobian, and Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs about Ad-
judicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 Intl J L & Econ 289
(No 3, 1995).
7 Douglas Davis and Charles Holt, Experimental Economics (Princeton University Press,
1992); and John Kagel and Alvin Roth eds, The Handbook of Experimental Economics
(Princeton University Press, 1995).
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marized in the next section. For the clients themselves, Gilson and Mnookin
argue that many disputes pose a Prisoner’s Dilemma encapsulated in their
finitely repeated litigation game, with an expected equilibrium of ‘‘defect/
defect.’’ In their ‘‘prelitigation game,’’ disputants choose lawyers who have
valuable and observable reputations to represent them in the dispute. These
choices are revealed, and any client who has chosen a cooperative lawyer
and is facing a noncooperative one may change her decision. Under the as-
sumptions of the prelitigation game, because a lawyer’s reputation for coop-
eration serves as a bond to the client’s cooperation in the litigation process,
Gilson and Mnookin suggest that the equilibrium changes to full coopera-
tion.
Section III describes our experimental implementation of the Gilson/
Mnookin model. The experiment involved two different treatments of a fi-
nitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, one with the prelitigation game
and one without. We derive the equilibria for our experimental games and
discuss some important experimental procedures. Section IV presents the
results. We find that significantly more cooperative agents are chosen (and
cooperative moves made) in the prelitigation game than in the litigation
game. These results are also compared with slightly different earlier Prison-
er’s Dilemma experiments. Section V is a brief conclusion.
II. The Gilson/Mnookin Model
A. The Litigation Game
Gilson and Mnookin argue that the Prisoner’s Dilemma provides a useful
heuristic to illuminate a common characteristic of litigation. They argue
that, ‘‘[i]n many disputes, each litigant may feel compelled to make a con-
tentious move either to exploit, or to avoid exploitation by the other side.
Yet, the combination of contentious moves by both results in a less efficient
outcome than if the litigants had been able to cooperate.’’8
Gilson and Mnookin model this aspect of litigation by describing initially
a ‘‘litigation game’’ in which there are two parties and a judge and the dis-
pute concerns the proper division of $100 according to some legal standard.
Each party has information not known to the other, some favorable and
some unfavorable. Before the judge decides the case, there is a one-stage
simultaneous disclosure process in which each litigant hands the judge and
the other side a sealed envelope containing information. Only two moves
are possible. A party can cooperate by voluntarily disclosing to the other
side (and to the judge) all material information in her possession or defect,
8 Gilson and Mnookin, at 514 (cited in note 1).
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‘‘which involves adversarial use of disclosure process to hide unfavorable
information.’’9 The consequence of defection is that the other side must
spend $15 to force disclosure of some but not all of the withheld informa-
tion. The payoff matrix takes the familiar form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.10
Gilson and Mnookin argue that a Prisoner’s Dilemma is an appropriate
model for much but not all litigation.11 They suggest that a single lawsuit
can be seen as consisting of a number of strategic encounters and can be
thought of as akin to a finite repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
The unique equilibrium of the finitely repeated game involves defection
throughout.12
B. The Prelitigation Game
Gilson and Mnookin go on to suggest that introducing lawyers with repu-
tations into the client’s Prisoner’s Dilemma model of litigation might, under
some circumstances, lead to a more efficient outcome by promoting cooper-
ation. They illustrate this possibility by creating a ‘‘prelitigation game’’ in
which clients choose lawyers. It is then the lawyers who go on to play the
litigation game for the clients.
Among the lawyers whom a client may choose are a class of practitioners
‘‘who have reputations for cooperation which assure that, once retained,
they will conduct the litigation in a cooperative fashion.’’13 In the prelitiga-
tion game, clients must disclose their choice of lawyers, and it is assumed
that each side will know prior to the beginning of the litigation game
whether the other side has chosen a cooperative lawyer. In the prelitigation
game, if one client chooses a cooperative lawyer (known only to cooperate
in litigation) and her opponent does not, then only the client originally
9 Id at 514–15.
10 Id at 515. If both sides cooperate, the judge splits the $100 equally ($50/$50). If both
defect, each party receives $35, the same $50 in judgment minus $15 spent to disclose infor-
mation. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the judge awards the defector $70 and
the sucker only $30 because not all of the defector’s unfavorable information is revealed to
the judge. The sucker thus has a net recovery of only $15.
11 We will not repeat here the justifications provided in the article for the use of the Prison-
er’s Dilemma to model litigation. See id at 516–20, 534–37. Gilson and Mnookin discuss at
some length the extent to which the evidence of existing institutional patterns is consistent
with the various assumptions underlying the ‘‘litigation game’’ and ‘‘prelitigation game.’’
12 Id at 520–522. There has been experimental and theoretical work from many different
disciplines using the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, originally attributed to
A. W. Tucker. Similarities between previous experimental research and our results are ad-
dressed below.
13 Id at 522. The article develops in some detail the reasons one might expect there would
be a supply of as well as demand for cooperative lawyers (id at 522–27), as well as the
various agency problems that might subvert cooperation (id at 527–34).
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choosing a cooperative lawyer can alter her choice of attorney. Thereafter,
the litigation game begins, each client being represented by their own law-
yer and no further changes in lawyers allowed.
When there are only two types of lawyers to choose between (coopera-
tive and gladiatorial), the prelitigation game has a weakly dominant strategy
of always choosing a cooperative lawyer. By choosing cooperative attor-
neys who will not defect in the litigation game—because doing so will de-
stroy their valued reputation—clients are able to avoid the inefficient out-
come of what would otherwise be a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Another way to understand the result is to see that lawyers, acting as
agents, can extend the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game and thus
change the equilibrium. The extension achieved through the prelitigation
game relies on the notion of lawyers having reputations for cooperation that
are publicly known.14
III. Experimental Implementation
A. The Games and Equilibria
The Gilson/Mnookin model predicts that there will be more cooperation
in the prelitigation game than in the litigation game. The experiment de-
signed to test this prediction involves two treatments of a finitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
In both treatments, subjects are shown a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma
matrix (Figure 1) and asked to choose an agent to play this game 10 times
in a row for them (to represent them in a lawsuit). Agent A (the cooperative
lawyer) always plays A (the cooperative move) in the matrix below. Agent
B (the gladiator lawyer) always plays B (the noncooperative move) in the
matrix below. The experiment used to test this model introduces a third sort
14 Two other models use the technique of extending a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
game to induce cooperation. David Hirshleifer and Eric Rasmusen (Cooperation in a Re-
peated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Ostracism, 12 J Econ Behav & Org 87 (1989)) present a
model of an n-person finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with ostracism (banishment) in
which cooperation is sustainable. This model has some similarities to the lawyer’s viewpoint
in the prelitigation game described in Gilson and Mnookin (cited in note 1). There, noncoop-
erative lawyers are not hired (and are thus effectively ostracized), sustaining the population
of cooperative lawyers. In a different extension Robert Lapson (Cooperation by Indirect Rev-
elation through Strategic Behavior, 23 Intl J Game Theory 65 (1994)) extends the one-stage
Prisoner’s Dilemma game to a two-stage game to induce cooperation. Two distinctions be-
tween this extension and that of Gilson and Mnookin are worth noting. First, Lapson’s model
takes a single-shot game and extends it to a two-stage single-shot game, while Gilson and
Mnookin take a finitely repeated game and extend it an additional stage. Second, Lapson’s
extension occurs at the end of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, while Gilson and Mnookin’s
is at the beginning.
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Figure 1.—The Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix
of lawyer, who is a mix between the two; the gladiator lawyer remains
weakly dominant. Agent C (the lawyer without a reputation) will play any
prespecified combination of A and B in periods 1–10. For simplicity, agent
C’s choices are assumed to be strict mixtures of moves A and B (subjects
choosing agent C and specifying all A moves are treated as having chosen
agent A).
In the treatment without the prelitigation game, subjects choose lawyers
who then go on to represent them. In this game, the dominant strategy equi-
librium is to choose a gladiator lawyer (agent B).15
In the prelitigation game treatment, subjects choose a lawyer and are then
matched. Any subject who chooses a cooperative lawyer (agent A) and
faces a lawyer who is not cooperative (agents B or C) is given the option
to change his choice. This two-stage game is depicted in Figure 2. The sin-
gle numbers in the matrix of Figure 2 refer to the trees in the bottom part
of the figure. Notice that the payoffs when one player chooses agent C are
described as ranges rather than values. The exact value will depend on what
15 Assume your counterpart chooses agent A. If you choose agent A you will earn $5 in
the upcoming game. If you choose agent B you will earn $7 in the upcoming game. If you
choose agent C you will earn somewhere strictly between $5 and $7 in the upcoming game
(depending on exactly what mix of moves you use). Since you earn at least as much by
choosing agent B as by choosing any other agent, agent B is your best response in this case.
Now assume your counterpart chooses agent B. Choosing agent A earns you $1, while choos-
ing agent B earns you $3. Again, agent C earns you some amount between $1 and $3. Your
best response is to choose agent B in this case as well. Agent C is a combination of agents
A and B; thus agent B is also a best response when your counterpart chooses agent C. Since
agent B is your best response no matter what your counterpart chooses in the upcoming
game, agent B is a dominant strategy. Having both players choose agent B is the unique
equilibrium of this game.
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Figure 2.—The prelitigation game
mixture the subject chooses.16 This game has a Pareto-optimal subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium of always choosing agent A (cooperate through-
out). In this equilibrium both players choose agent A (neither has the oppor-
tunity to switch), and both earn $5. To see that this is an equilibrium we
show no player can be made better off by playing some other move.17 This
16 For example, assume one player chooses agent B while the other chooses agent C. How
much could each of them earn? If the agent C player specifies the most cooperative moves
possible (nine A moves and one B move), she will earn $1.20, while the agent B player will
earn $6.60. If the agent C player specifies the least cooperative moves possible (nine B moves
and one A move), she will earn $2.80, while the agent B player will earn $3.40. As the agent
C player moves from more cooperative moves to less cooperative moves, her payoff rises
while agent B’s payoff falls. Other ranges of payoffs in this and future figures were con-
structed in a similar manner. Strictly speaking, a matrix that completely described this game
would include agents c1, c2, . . . , cn, where n is the total number of possible combinations
of moves A or B over 10 periods. However, all these moves will be dominated, thus for
expositional simplicity we here combine those strategies into a single one, C.
17 Consider a player choosing agent B instead. We go to tree 1 and see that the A player
(his counterpart) will have an opportunity to change his agent. If he keeps his choice at agent
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Figure 3.—Reduced-form matrix
game also has a (weak) Nash equilibrium of always choosing agent B. To
see that this is also an equilibrium we refer to Figure 3. The payoffs in
Figure 3 were calculated by assuming the A player chooses the profit-max-
imizing option, then by folding back the trees in Figure 2 and placing the
end payoffs into the original matrix.
Both players choosing agent A in the matrix above is a Nash equilibrium
of this game, as shown in note 16 above. However, both players choosing
agent B is also an equilibrium. If both players do it, neither has any incen-
tive to deviate.18 This equilibrium is less attractive than the agent A equilib-
A, he will earn $1. If he changes his choice to agent B, he will earn $3. If he changes his
choice to agent C, he will earn anywhere between $1.20 and $2.80, depending on what se-
quence of moves he chooses. Choosing agent B is his best response. Now both players are
using agent B, so the payoff from this original agent B choice is $3. Choosing agent A ini-
tially earned $5, thus, if the other player is choosing agent A, you prefer choosing agent A
to agent B. What about agent C? Consider a player choosing agent C instead of agent A. We
go to tree 2 and see that the A player (his counterpart) will again have an opportunity to
change his agent. If he keeps his choice at agent A, he will earn anywhere between $1.40
and $4.60, depending on the particular moves the C player specified for his agent. If he
changes his choice to agent B, he will earn anywhere between $3.40 and $6.60. If he changes
his choice to agent C, he will earn anywhere between $1.60 and $6.40, depending on what
sequence of moves he chooses. Again, choosing agent B is his best response. Now the origi-
nal player is using agent C, and the other player is using agent B. The payoff to the original
player from this combination of strategies is anywhere between $1.20 and $2.80. Choosing
agent A initially earned $5, thus, if the other player is choosing agent A, you prefer choosing
agent A to agent C.
18 Consider a player choosing agent A instead. He will then have an opportunity to change,
and his best response implies changing his choice back to agent B. Thus the player is no
better off having changed his choice. Consider a player choosing agent C instead. He will
not have an opportunity to change his choice (he has not chosen a cooperative agent); thus
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rium for two reasons. First, it is a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Second, and
most important, it involves playing a weakly dominated strategy (choosing
agent B). Thus this equilibrium does not survive any equilibrium refine-
ments (for example, trembling-hand perfection).19 Interestingly enough,
playing agent C with any distribution of moves is not an equilibrium. Agent
B strictly dominates agent C.
As one seminar participant pointed out, there is a sense in which the pre-
litigation game might result in less cooperation than the litigation game.20
If we hold initial choices of agents constant, the prelitigation game gives
players an opportunity to switch away from their initial choice of agent A,
an opportunity they would not have had in the litigation game. If, for exam-
ple, three out of five players choose agent A in the litigation game, pairing
each player with each other player yields approximately 11 percent (A, A)
pairs, 54 percent (A, B) pairs, and 35 percent (B, B) pairs. If players chose
the same agents initially in the prelitigation game, and then everyone who
had the opportunity to switch actually switched to agent B, the mix would
become approximately 11 percent (A, A) pairs and 89 percent (B, B) pairs
(since all the agent A players previously stuck in the (A, B) pairs would
change their representation to agent B). The claim that the prelitigation
game implements more rather than less cooperation relies on enough sub-
jects changing their initial choices from agent B to agent A in the prelitiga-
tion game, as the equilibrium predicts.21
As in the Gilson/Mnookin model, the unique Nash equilibrium of the liti-
gation game used in this experiment involves both players choosing a gladi-
ator lawyer (agent B). There are two Nash equilibria of the prelitigation
game, both players choosing a cooperative lawyer (agent A) and both
choosing a gladiator lawyer (agent B). However, the agent A equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the agent B equilibrium and is the only one which sur-
vives equilibrium refinements.
he will earn anywhere between $1.20 and $2.40, depending on which mixture of A and B
moves he specifies. However, this is strictly less than the $3 he would have earned had he
remained with agent B. Thus if both players choose agent B, neither has an incentive to
change his move.
19 For a description of trembling-hand perfection and other equilibrium refinements, see
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press, 1991).
20 We thank Brian Lambert for bringing this point to our attention. The following analysis
ignores possible choices of agent C altogether.
21 If the prelitigation game involves only slightly more players choosing agent A than the
litigation game, the end result will be more defection rather than less. Brian Lambert (per-
sonal communication) suggests that, as the percentage of B players grows, the costs of
allowing A players to switch in round 2 may overcome the benefits of the model’s incentives
to ‘‘try A.’’ In particular, if there is a 25 percent B population, then the prelitigation game
and the litigation game are almost indistinguishable in their results.
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B. Experimental Implementation
Subjects in the experiment were all students at Harvard Law School.
Subjects were recruited in their classrooms, and the experiment took place
in the same rooms. Forty subjects participated in the litigation game (base-
line) treatment, and 46 in the prelitigation game treatment.
Copies of the instructions were distributed to the subjects, placed on an
overhead projector, and read aloud to ensure common information. Since
the game is symmetric, all subjects were told to imagine they were the row
player in the game. Each subject chose one of three strategies (attorneys),
after which their response forms were collected.
In the baseline treatment, subjects moves were matched up and earnings
calculated while they completed a postexperimental questionnaire. Earnings
were placed into envelopes, labeled with subject numbers rather than
names, which subjects picked up as they left the classroom.
In the prelitigation game treatment subjects were matched up as well. All
subjects then received a second sheet of paper. If another move was re-
quired of them they responded on the sheet; if not, their sheet simply told
them to return it to the monitor. All sheets handed out at this stage were
collected, thus no subject could tell whether or if another subject had a sec-
ondary move to make. Earnings were then calculated, placed in envelopes
and picked up by the subjects as before, after they had completed their post-
experimental questionnaire. No show-up fee was paid, although all subjects





Litigation game (N 5 40) 7 17 16
Prelitigation game (N 5 46) 35 6 5
IV. Experimental Results
A. Raw Data and Analysis
Table 1 summarizes the raw data from the experiment.22 The main results
from this experiment support the theory offered by Gilson and Mnookin:
22 Two C choosers in the normal game chose all one move (one chose all A and one chose
all B). This analysis counts those choices as A or B choices.
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TABLE 2
% Choices of Cooperative Agent (Agent A)
t-Test Significance
Percentage of Proportions Level
Litigation game (N 5 40) 17.5
6.738 .000
Prelitigation game (N 5 46) 76.1
TABLE 3
% Cooperative Moves Made (A)
t-Test Significance
Percentage of Proportions Level
Litigation game (N 5 400) 39.0
13.522 .000
Prelitigation game (N 5 460) 80.4
significantly more cooperative agents are chosen in the prelitigation game
than in the litigation game. Table 2 shows the percentage of cooperative
agents chosen in each treatment and reports the significance test.23
Another measure that may be of interest is the number of cooperative
moves made by the subjects. This differs from the choice of cooperative
agents only in that some individuals chose agent C, whose actions included
some mix of cooperative and noncooperative moves. The two treatments
were significantly different in the expected direction for this measure of co-
operativeness as well, as shown in Table 3.24
One final question that the data can address involves changes in the type
of lawyer actually made in the prelitigation game. As was seen in Figure 2,
if a player is given an opportunity to change his choice, his dominant strat-
egy is to change to agent B. In the prelitigation game treatment of the ex-
23 The significance test used here is the t-test of proportions. Two proportions are consid-
ered different from each other if their t-statistic is significant, where Pi is the proportion of
successes in treatment i, Ni is the number of observations, and t is calculated as
P1 2 P2
√P1(1 2 P1)N1 1 P2(1 2 P2)N2
.
24 There are some statistical problems with this measure. The t-test of proportions assumes
independent observations, which is not the case when individual moves are being analyzed
(since one subject generates 10 observations). The difference between the treatments is so
significant, however, that this technicality is overlooked here.
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periment nine subjects were in a position to change their choices. Of those,
six switched to agent B (the dominant strategy), while three switched to
agent C. None remained with agent A.25
The results of this experiment strongly supported the predictions of Gil-
son and Mnookin. As predicted, subjects in the prelitigation game were sig-
nificantly more likely to choose cooperative lawyers than were subjects in
the litigation game.
B. Comparison with Previous Experiments
The litigation game treatment of this experiment provides an interesting
comparison with other repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments.26 In most
previous experiments, subjects are told their counterpart’s move, and their
earnings, in round n before having to make their decisions in round n 1 1.
Thus reactive strategies (like tit-for-tat and trigger strategies) are feasible.
In both treatments of this experiment, subjects specified all 10 moves in
advance; thus no reactive strategies were permitted. Are the results of this
experiment similar to those observed under reactive conditions?
The answer is generally yes, with some caveats. Comparing data across
experiments is always a delicate operation. Though all the experiments dis-
cussed in this section used a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, the exact
payoffs in each cell varied from experiment to experiment. Experimental
procedures (instructions, compensation, anonymity, and the like) all varied
as well.
In one of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma experimental papers, Lester
Lave ran 19 pairs of subjects through a Prisoner’s Dilemma 100 times.27
The payoffs when both subjects cooperated was positive, although the
‘‘sucker’’ payoff (the payoff a player earns when he cooperates and his
counterpart defects) and the payoff to subjects when they both defected
were negative. Subjects were paired, given some money, played the game
100 times, and took home their retained earnings. Data from this experi-
25 Of the three players who switched to C, one chose five A moves and five B moves, one
chose four A moves and six B moves, and the last chose six A moves and four B moves.
26 Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah’s book Prisoner’s Dilemma (University of Mich-
igan Press, 1965) provides a historical review of Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments in experi-
mental psychology. Robyn Dawes and Richard Thaler provide a more recent discussion of
cooperation more generally: Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J Econ Persp 187 (1988). For a re-
cent review of Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments, see David Sally, Conversation and Cooper-
ation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-analysis of Experiments from 1958–1992, 7 Rationality &
Soc 58 (No 1, 1995).
27 Lester Lave, An Empirical Approach to the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game, 76 Q J Econ
424 (1962).
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Figure 4.—Players cooperating in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: first series. (This figure is re-
produced from Lester Lave, An Empirical Approach to the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game, 76 Q
J Econ 424, figure 6 (1962).)
ment are in the form of a graph, reproduced here as Figure 4, which depicts
the percentage of cooperative moves for each of the 100 periods.
The percentage of cooperative moves varies over the course of the game,
from just under 60 percent in the first period to just above 60 percent in the
last. Overall, the level of cooperation is higher than we observed in the liti-
gation game in this article (39 percent).
Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah report an experiment in which 70
pairs of subjects were matched and played the Prisoner’s Dilemma 300
times. They tested games of varying levels of payoffs, while retaining the
Prisoner’s Dilemma structure. As in the Lave experiments, payoffs from
both players defecting and the sucker’s payoff were negative. However,
subjects in this experiment did not keep the money they earned in the game
but were instead given a flat participation fee. Rapoport and Chammah re-
port cooperation rates varying from 27 percent to 77 percent, based on the
particular payoff configuration.28
In possibly the most comparable experiment to ours, L. G. Morehous ran
(among other games) a 10-round finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma ex-
periment.29 (The increased comparability comes from the similarities of the
28 Rapoport and Chammah (cited in note 26).
29 L. G. Morehous, One-Play, Two-Play, Five-Play and Ten-Play Runs of Prisoner’s Di-
lemma 10, No. 3 Conflict Resolution 354 (1966).
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lengths of the games.) Ninety-six pairs of undergraduate students partici-
pated in the experiment. They were paid based on their moves. Again, pay-
offs to joint defection as well as the sucker’s payoff were negative, while
payoffs to joint cooperation were positive. Morehous found that 42 percent
of subjects made cooperative moves in the 10-period repeated game.
Finally, in a more modern treatment of the finitely repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, James Andreoni and John Miller report an experiment in which
14 subjects play a series of 20 10-round games.30 Subjects are paid their
earnings, and all payoffs in the matrix are nonnegative. They find that,
within each set of 10 games, subjects cooperate substantially more in the
early rounds than in the later ones. Average cooperation rates start at just
over 60 percent and decrease through the course of the game to end under
10 percent, with the decrease being relatively monotonic.31
The experimental results from the litigation game are quite similar to
those of previously run 10-round repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games. Our
subjects made 39 percent of their moves cooperatively, while Morehous’s
subjects cooperated 42 percent of the time. Varying levels of cooperation
were found by Lave and Rapoport and Chammah when the game was re-
peated hundreds of times.
V. Conclusions
This article presents an experimental test of a Gilson/Mnookin model in
which the choice of lawyer facilitates client cooperation in lawsuits. Litiga-
tion without lawyers is modeled as a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Litigation with lawyers involves a prelitigation game in which, with no risk,
a client can initially choose a cooperative lawyer and thus signal a willing-
ness to cooperate. In the Gilson/Mnookin model, the addition of this preliti-
gation stage changes the equilibrium from defection to cooperation. The re-
sults of the experiment suggest that extending the game in this way actually
does increase cooperation significantly.
The Gilson and Mnookin article suggested that lawyers develop reputa-
tions and that the reputation for being cooperative problem solvers can be
a valuable asset. They argue that ‘‘the relationship between opposing law-
yers and their capacity to establish a credible reputation for cooperation
have profound implications for dispute resolution.’’32 The experiment de-
scribed in this article obviously tests only a small, but important piece of
30 James Andreoni and John Miller, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prison-
er’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence, 103 Econ J 570 (1993).
31 We use their partner’s treatment for comparison, where subjects play all 10 games with
the same counterpart.
32 Gilson and Mnookin, at 564 (cited in note 1).
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their much more complicated, and institutionally elaborate argument. Nev-
ertheless, the results of our experiment do suggest that self-interested clients
would frequently choose cooperative lawyers if they could be confident that
either (1) the other side would do the same or, (2) if the other side did not,
they could switch their representation. It also suggests that the existence of
cooperative lawyers with recognizable reputations may well support more
cooperative client behavior.
In conclusion, two important but obvious points bear emphasis. First, as
Gilson and Mnookin themselves point out, the real world of litigation is
much more complicated than their model. They suggest that not all litiga-
tion has a payoff structure consistent with a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Moreover, the assumptions of the prelitigation game (and the rules govern-
ing our experiment) are demanding: reputations are known in advance, and
stable; a client can costlessly switch from a cooperative attorney to a gladia-
torial one if the other side fails to choose a cooperative attorney; and no
changes in attorneys are permitted once the litigation game begins. A simi-
lar point was also made by Russell Korobkin, who suggested that in the
real world litigants may not know or understand the payoffs involved with
their choice of lawyers.33
The realism or appropriateness of these (demanding) assumptions are not
tested in the experiment presented in this article. Rather, the experiment
provides a test of the implications of these assumptions. If all these condi-
tions are met, is the outcome we observe the outcome we expect—more
cooperation? The answer from this experiment is a conclusive yes.
The second point is equally obvious but also important. To the extent
there are real-world institutions that facilitate and promote the efficiency of
reputational markets, it would seem that cooperation might well be en-
hanced. These results pose an interesting question—well beyond the scope
of this article—about what institutional arrangements might best support
and promote the existence of reputational markets. Other sorts of re-
search—empirical rather than experimental—might usefully explore the
complex set of puzzles concerning how reputations are developed and are
sustained, and how lawyers actually cooperate in the litigation process.
33 Russell Korobkin, personal communication.
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